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Reviewed by Michael Vater, Marquette University 
 
This compilation of essays brings to the English-speaking world a rich sampling of European and 
North American scholarship on J.G. Fichte’s philosophical activity from 1795 to 1800. What 
most of the histories of philosophy recount as the Wissenschaftslehre is the hurriedly 
assembled and unbalanced presentation Fichte produced for his first lectures in Jena in 1794-
1795, entitled Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge. In 1795-1796 Fichte laid out a 
legal philosophy, published in 1796-1797 as Foundations of Natural Right, which was based on 
the principles of the Wissenschaftslehre and seemed to revise his earlier thinking. 
Consciousness is no longer seen to be self-positing in an individualistic sense, but to include in 
its very basis intersubjectivity, or the mutual determination of a plurality of wills. Fichte 
continued the rethinking of his system when in 1796-1797 and two subsequent academic years 
he returned to the task of articulating the basic principles of human knowledge. The lectures—
known as Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo— take a self-reflective or phenomenological 
approach to doing transcendental philosophy and turn away from the perplexing, quasi-
foundational triple posits of the 1794-1795 version, and from its bifurcation of theoretical and 
practical philosophy and, underlying that, the duplicity of ’representation’ and ’feeling’. 
Breazeale’s Introduction takes pains to point out that scholarly opinion is divided on whether 
there is more continuity than difference between the earlier and later Jena systems. 
 
Five essays on the more accessible Foundations of Natural Right open the volume, followed by 
seven on the nova methodo lectures. Another seven essays, addressing various themes in 
Fichte’s early works, conclude the volume. In a brief review, I can touch on only a few 
contributions in the first two sets. Fichte is a ’philosopher’s philosopher’ whose arguments are 
complicated and embedded in long theoretical traditions—both in epistemology and in 
jurisprudence. These essays are similarly technical, and a good many of them resolve apparent 
difficulties in Fichte’s arguments into more basic, but still insoluble quandaries. Fichte’s basic 
project—to give a wholly idealistic account of the feeling of objectivity that experience 
delivers—knowingly flirts with contradiction from the start in order to give an account of 
knowledge and action premised on primitive freedom or ’agility’. 
 
Klaus Brinkmann explores the idea of the complementarity of human beings which Fichte builds 
into Natural Right in two related ideas: intersubjectivity and reciprocal recognition. Because the 
self-conscious individual can become conscious of her freedom or self-determination only 
through another consciousness, as agent she can act only with and against an other which is 
recognized as equally free and self-determining. Recognition presupposed intersubjectivity, 
though it is not reducible to it. Brinkmann concurs with Robert Williams and Vittorio Hösle that 
Fichte did not fully exploit the idea in moving from theoretical foundations to notoriously 
restrictive legal and political recommendations. He takes issue, however, with Fichte’s 
derivation of mutual recognition from the principle of intersubjectivity, especially with the 
’summons’ (Aufforderung) whereby a second or ’outside’ rational being stimulates the 
potentially free being into active self-determination. The ’summons’ either involves a regress or 
simply begs the question about the social nature of consciousness. Brinkmann acknowledges 
that Fichte saw this dilemma and attempted to diffuse it by describing the ’summoner’ (or 
educating consciousness) as a “necessary fact” or simple condition of consciousness. The move, 
however, transforms an epistemic condition into an ontological one: only a transcendent other 
or ’unsummoned summoner’ could explain the human’s condition of being determined to be 
self-determining. But such an outside influence vitiates the intended idealism of 
Wissenschaftslehre, which, Fichte reasoned, must start with uncompromised or pure freedom 
to end with a plurality of rationally limited free beings. 
 
Robert Williams focuses on what, from the point of view of later theory, is disappointing in 
Natural Right’s deployment of recognition, namely, the fact that it is supplanted by coercion as 
the conceptual basis of right and returns Fichte’s legal and social thinking to the egoistic 
bedrock of the Hobbesian contract tradition. What is novel in Fichte’s treatment of law is that it 
invokes the intertwined social- and self-conscious nature of the human as the primitive “fact of 
reason,” much the way Kant used the moral law as the ’factual’ basis of freedom. Williams does 
not see much problematic in Fichte’s march from a primitive act of imagination that conceives 
of rational agency as plural--and so lets me affirm my freedom only to the extent that I affirm 
the possibility of the other’s freedom—to the ’summons’, and from there to mutual recognition 
as embodied free agents in a physical world. What Williams finds disquieting is the 
displacement of this positive idea, used to define the concept of right, by the negative notion of 
coercion in the sections that concretely spell out juridical and political structures. Coercion 
seems to justify a preemptive exclusion of ’outsiders’ from the socially cohesive ’recognizers’; 
legislation is aimed at redressing the inevitable wrongs which arise in a world where trust and 
confidence have been irretrievably lost. Williams closes his essay with a look at Hegel’s 
criticisms of Fichte. In the Difference essay, Hegel takes Fichte to task for conceiving I and not-I 
as merely other, hence for conceiving freedom as fixed opposition rather than the transcending 
of opposition. In his Natural Law essay, Hegel criticizes Fichte for rationalizing only the external 
state, where public authority, state security, and criminality are the sole juridical and political 
concerns, not the positive expression of social freedom. The state based on penal redress 
(coercion) can see no farther than the surveillance camera. 
 
Other essays explore more specific themes of Natural Right. Jean Christoph Merle considers 
Fichte’s theory of punishment. Despite its superficial resemblance to Beccaria’s and Bentham’s 
utilitarian arguments, Merle finds Fichte’s pragmatic standard of punishment—detain the 
criminal until she is improved, i.e., poses as much and as little a threat to the community as any 
other citizen—has good Kantian grounds. It uses coercive action to maintain the external 
coexistence of freedom among agents, and it treats the criminal as a moral agent or end in 
itself insofar as it punishes with the consent of the punished (who has an eye on the possibility 
of eventually restored legal freedom). 
 
The essays on the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo are comparative in nature; they look back 
to the 1794-1795 Foundations and wrestle with the question of whether the apparently new 
material of 1796-1799 is merely a different form of presentation or whether it represents an 
alteration of Fichte’s basic views. 
 
Johannes Brachtendorf approaches the difference question head on. There are three elements 
or principles that ground the earlier Wissenschaftslehre: there is a foundational and 
presuppositionless first element that pervades all in virtue of its indeterminacy; a second 
introduces negation and so determinacy; a third extends the first two out to completeness or 
thoroughgoing determinacy. The 1794-1795 Foundations, however, offered no less than three 
accounts of how these elements work together: (1) The first account gives the familiar three 
principles of the opening sections, wherein I and not-I are synthesized in a third principle, which 
subsequent analysis shows to have more concrete, but still complex elements. (2) The second 
account abandons the unraveling of the ongoing I = not-I synthesis and instead resorts to the 
power of imagination (Ineinsbilding: identification) and the ’check’ to unite the infinite and the 
finite I. (3) The third attempt to go from completeness back to identity is the “practical 
philosophy,” wherein the I becomes a striving to annihilate its objective conditions. 
Brachtendorf believes the latter two fail because of Fichte’s implausible insistence on the 
ideality of the check; there is no way, he argues, that a principle of determinacy can be 
introduced that is not tied to external influence or original objectivity. The nova methodo 
lectures bypass these failed attempts to introduce determinacy into the indeterminate from the 
inside by eliminating the second element: negation, restriction, not-I, or ’check’. Immediate 
consciousness is the primary and indeterminate element, just as the I’s primordial activity was 
in the earlier version, but it is only potentially conscious. Real consciousness comes on the 
scene with self-reflection, and in self-reflection consciousness determines itself. The I and the 
not-I of the earlier Wissenschaftslehre become not opposed principles, but differing points of 
view upon the same consciousness: as active, consciousness is I; as passivity or rest, it is not-I, 
or ’being’ as Fichte most often calls it now. Though Fichte abandons the circular methodology 
of the 1794 Foundation, the new presentation showcases the function of ’imagination’—
nondiscursive or holistic determination, in contract to the focused or local determination 
involved in conceptual thinking. 
 
Brachtendorf’s discussion, clear as it is, illustrates the pitfalls that confront the Fichte scholar. 
Fichte is always between different versions and defenses of Wissenschaftslehre and usually 
works at his basic vision in a series of very intricate arguments. The critic is stuck with Fichte’s 
vocabulary and not quite plainly justified methodology and is at a loss to translate it into other 
terms and cognitive paradigms. Daniel Breazeale addresses that quandary with an attempt to 
fit an outside paradigm—the ’philosophical fiction’ as used by Salomon Maimon to interpret 
Leibniz’s philosophy—onto Fichte’s speculation. Critics have been used, claims Breazeale, to 
view Fichte either through ’constructivist’ or through ’phenomenological lenses’. Though one 
might want to view the author of the 1794-1795 Foundations as a constructivist and that of the 
Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo as a phenomenologist, things are not that simple. Part III of 
the 1794 Wissenschaftslehre proceeds descriptively, not deductively, and some of Fichte’s 
strongest foundationalist claims are presented in writings penned in 1800. Breazeale pursues 
the idea of interpreting Wissenschaftslehre in a third or ’middle’ way, wherein the large 
theoretical concepts of absolute I and not-I, or of consciousness as such and reflection, or 
freedom and limitation (whether in the guise of ’check’ or ’feeling’ or ’summons’) can be 
postulated, isolated and conceptually refined, and reintegrated in such a way that initially 
different concepts will come to be seen as reciprocal, and isolated elements be seen as part of a 
dialectically necessary totality. What this ’fictional method’ may show, says Breazeale, is not 
the truth, but only the necessary assumability of these items—”necessary, that is, if one wants 
to “make sense” of one’s own, profoundly divided being in the world.” At the end, however, 
Breazeale draws back from this thought experiment: Fichte made too many metaphilosophical 
claims about the existence of one true philosophy and consistently argued for the superiority of 
idealism over dogmatism. One cannot make such claims if one’s philosophy is merely one story 
among others. 
 
In a difficult but valuable contribution, Günter Zöller swims against the stream that wants to 
dissolve all empirical selfhood into social relations. He suggests that the interpersonality or 
intersubjectivity that contemporary readers find so pertinent in the Wissenschaftslehre nova 
methodo is a derived or secondary social relationship, one that depends upon a proto-social 
relation between the individual (i.e., the finite rational being) and its locating or determining 
ground. To explain this, Zöller undertakes an account of the transcendental ground of 
individuality, as Fichte explained it in his later Jena writings. In Natural Right the free agent 
becomes self-determining and free in a social sense by appearing as a body within a material 
world wherein, as mediated through gesture and language, its freedom is secured by 
recognition and subsequently embodied in law—the coordination of the limited freedom of 
plural subjects. The individual is materialized, stresses Zöller, not by being embodied; its 
volitional limitation, freely self-determined, appears as its located body. The 1798 System of 
Ethics amplifies this view. Individuality is the result of self-objectifying subjectivity, of the I as 
striving. Fichte distinguished various strands of the ethical subject-in-situation: a ’natural drive’ 
which provides the content of willing, a ’pure drive’ which accounts for the reach of desire and 
conation, and the ’moral drive’ which is regarded as a product of the prior two. The ultimate 
goal of all striving and action is the reintegration of reason and nature. When it comes to finite 
actions, this means that the rational is to predominate over the particular in the rational 
person’s deeds, or that the moral world is willed identically by all agents. The ethical end of 
Fichte’s individual is to unite with its world in such a way that her difference and particularity 
are vanishing features. The account of individuality is deepened, however, in the 1796-1799 
nova methodo lectures, where Fichte brings together the individuality of a person’s moral 
character and the social individuation that comes from location in a social milieu to forge the 
concept of ’pure willing’—the proto-cognitive and proto-volitional state which is postulated as 
the transcendental ground of subjectivity (and objectivity). For Fichte, the freedom of a rational 
being consists in ’thinking’, i.e., the production of a determination in a determinable basis 
(which itself is not given before the free determination). This ’thinking’ is without deliberation, 
without prior cognition; it is situating, not in situation. This seizing oneself out of the realm of 
all rational being is one’s ’main character’: the determination to self-determination that is both 
the nature and the act of the rational being. It appears empirically as the ’summons’, the 
socially mediated solicitation to rational existence, e.g., the education into human being that 
one’s family and social interactions provide. While for the individual, this being-summoned and 
the rational agents behind it take on the experiential guise of independent existence, on the 
philosophical level only the rational being itself is responsible for its adopting the stance of 
rationality. It is apparent, argues Zöller, that the dependence of one’s rationality upon its 
solicitation by another rational being finally explains nothing, that there must be an ultimate 
foundation for individuality, a call from some “solicitor general” to assume free existence. “No 
individual is able to account for itself on the basis of itself alone,” and so one is driven to 
philosophically postulate some supra-individual ground of individuality—the pure will that is 
identified with the “divine will” in the popular and theistically tinged Vocation of Man. The 
intersubjectivity or interpersonality, therefore, that characterized the construction of the finite 
I in the second Jena system is not the firm ground Fichte sought for Wissenschaftslehre. There is 
more continuity than discontinuity when, having left Jena, Fichte’s thought takes a theistic (if 
somewhat transcendentally problematic) turn. 
 
One can see from these summaries that a great deal of sophisticated analysis is here dedicated 
to Fichte’s lesser known works, and that his contribution is not limited to the sudden, stellar 
appearance and swift subsequent implosion of the 1794-1795 Foundations. When one reads 
Fichte, one is plunged into a series of problems that seem to intensify just when they promise 
to open to solution. One is never quite sure whether one is dealing with Fichte’s problems (as a 
writer and theoretician) or with ’our’ problems as mental and material, individual and social, 
free and conditioned critters. But he never lets the thinker forget the ’and’. 
